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BILL SHAW,* BRENDA J. WINSLETT,** &
FRANK B. CROSS***

The Global Environment: A
Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil
Pollutiont
ABSTRACT
The authors begin their examination of the ocean pollution problem with a review of recent tanker accidents that have had long- and
short-term effects on the integrity of marine ecology. Furtherinquiry
leads to a focus on flagship-of-convenience tankers that appear to
contribute disproportionately to the oil production problem but are
not the sole cause. Routine discharges of oil ballast by the tanker
fleets of all registriesare even more atfault. The authors then explore
both internationaland unilateral efforts to reduce the problem, or
at least contain its dimensions. Findingthese efforts to be unavailing,
the authors propose an economic incentiveldisincentive system that
can be implemented internationallyor unilaterally, and a phasing
out of flagships-of-convenience. In a closing segment of the paper
the authors reinforce their legal and economic analysis with an
evaluation of the relevant ethical issues that are involved.

Marine oil pollution is a direct result of the Western industrialized
world's dependence on the petroleum of the oil-rich Middle-East.' Estimates of oil lost or discharged to the sea by tankers during transport
range from one to two million tons annually.2 Of this, approximately 75
percent is due to "operational" discharges-that is, the deballasting, tankwashing, and tank-washing premaintenance of oil tankers after their cargoes have been unloaded and they are headed back for a new load? The
remaining 25 percent is due largely to oil spills, with offshore drilling
contributing a comparatively negligible amount.4 Since "operational"
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tThe authors would like to acknowledge the research contribution of Patty Kelly. University of
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1. Dempsey & Helling, Oil Pollution by Ocean Vessels-An Environmental Tragedy: The Legal
Regime of Flags of Convenience, Multilateral Conventions. and Coastal States. 10 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 37, 49 (1980).
2. D. ABECASSIS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO OIL Pou.t.riox FRONI SHIPS 4 (1978).

3. Clausen, Liability for High Seas Oil Pollution Clean Up Costs: Domestic and International
Provisions, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 473. 481 (1980).
4. de Mestral, The Prevention of Pollution of the Marine Environment Arising from Offshore
Mining and Drilling, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469-71 (1979).
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discharge takes place over long distances on relatively widespread routes,
the impact on the environment is not readily discernible because the oil
is dispersed and the threat to plant and animal life is fairly minimal.
When ships collide or run aground and spill large amounts of oil in a
finite area tanker accidents create a real threat and damage to an ecosystem
by oil pollution.' Recent oil spills emphasize the seriousness of the threat
of oil pollution to the oceans.
Spills over the past fifteen years have increased both in frequency and
magnitude, resulting in damage to a substantial area of coastline.' Major
oil spills that have attracted considerable public attention date back to
the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 in which 117,000 tons of oil were
spilled into the English Channel at a cleanup cost of some $5 million.'
Such disasters continued throughout the past two decades. Among these
were the Santa Barbara channel oil well blowout of 1969, in which 13,888
tons of oil spilled into the waters along the California coast at a cost of
$8.5 million; the 1974 Metula sinking in the Strait of Magellan in which
50,000 tons of oil were lost; the 1976 Chesapeake Bay spill in which
256,000 gallons were lost in Virginia inland waters; the Argo Merchant
spill off Nantucket, Massachusetts, in which 7.2 million gallons of oil
were lost costing $5.2 million to clean up; and the sinking of the supertanker, Amoco Cadiz which dumped 69 million gallons of oil off the coast
of Brittany in 1978.' This last spill was considered to be the worst shipwreck in history, with clean up costs of $30 million. Of the 250,000 tons
of crude oil spilled, only about 15 to 20 percent was recovered. The rest
remains in the sea. 9
The devastating effects of an oil spill on a marine environment can be
best illustrated by some specific examples. Birds, for instance, have been
killed in great numbers due to suffocation and poisoning. The Torrey
Canyon disaster resulted in the death of more than 25,000 seabirds, most
of which were killed by the toxic detergents used to break down the
slick.' o The Santa Barbara blowout caused at least 3,600 birds to be
killed. Likewise, the Metula spill caused the death of 3,000 to 4,000
birds." Studies have shown that the deaths of these birds were the result
of oil coating their feathers, making them less buoyant and susceptible
to drowning. They were also poisoned when the oil was ingested during
preening, but birds are not the only wildlife affected by oil spills.
Algae, plankton, shellfish, fish, and large mammals all have died as
5. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 49.
6. Id. at 45.
7. Gundlack, Oil Tanker Disasters, 19 ENVIRONMENT 18 (Dec. 1977).
8. Id. at 19.
9. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 44.
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id.
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a direct result of exposure to oil in a spill.' 2 The Amoco Cadiz accident
alone temporarily destroyed over 2,000 acres of oyster beds, which constituted one-third of France's commercial seafood market that year. Sixteen days after the same spill, the bodies of dead urchins littered oneand-a-half miles of beach.' 3 The Santa Barbara spill substantially decreased the surrounding phytoplankton biomass, and large mammals and
their young, including seals, sea elephants, and one porpoise, were found
dead, presumably, from oil poisoning. Shore plants and animals were
also killed in this incident as a result of being smothered by the oozing
oil.' 4 In the Buzzard's Bay incident, where 700 tons of oil were spilled
off the Masschusetts coast, William Wertenbaker made this startling observation: "In scientific generalities, the marine animal population of the
area, in the course of the next week or so, declined from about 200,000
animals per square metre to about two animals per square metre." 5
The immediate effects of an oil spill on a marine environment are
obvious, as demonstrated above. Depending on such factors as the proximity of a spill, tidal conditions, wave activity, and toxicity of the spilled
crude oil,' 6 the results of a spill can be disastrous to marine life. "[Tlhe
Cousteau Society has stated that the long-range effects of such spills...
affect the reproductive capacity of various species of marine life and also
interfere with -the ocean food chain link by killing important food sources
of otherwise unaffected marine life."' 7 This is particularly disturbing
because 8the food chain, of which man is a part, has its beginnings in the
oceans. 1
It is clear that the continued need for oil will make heavy demands on
ocean routes for years to come. This article will address the problem of
the environmental or social cost that these transportation routes impose
in the form of tanker accidents and the routine discharges of tanker fleets.
These costs jeopardize the integrity of our global ecology, and they are
simply not accounted for in the market price of oil. The principal objective
of this article is to account for these costs by examining, first, the root
causes of marine oil pollution: the licensing and operation of flag of
convenience ships, a system that threatens the marine environment through
its high susceptibility to accidents and spillage, and the discharge of oily
ballasts into the seas as a standard operating procedure. Second, international cooperative methods of resolving the problem, unilateral efforts
by the United States and Great Britain, and the emerging potential and
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 46.
Amoco Cadiz: A Lasting Disaster, 144 Sct. NEws 85 (Aug. 5. 1978).
Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1, at 46.
Wertenbaker, A Small Spill. NEw YORKER (Nov. 26, 1973) at 68.
Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id.at 48.
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problems of a superfund and a strict liability model will be explored. The
concluding section will propose a system of fees or charges that is reinforced by widely-based moral and ethical considerations; the rational,
cross-cultural appeal of these moral propositions support the implementation of a control system that does indeed account for all costs of oil
transport (market and social).
THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION
Flags of Convenience
Under current rules of international law, each nation has the right to
allow ships to fly that nation's flag or, in other words, to allow ships
from different countries to register under a nation which has no other
connection with such ship. 9 The main flag of convenience countries
(FCCs) are Liberia, Panama, and Honduras. Liberia is by far the leading
grantor of flags, with ship registration fees comprising approximately
eight percent of its gross national product." The advantages of this arrangement to shipowners are numerous and largely financial in nature.
The attributes of flag of convenience registry to United States vessels
have been summarized as follows:
1) Transfer to a foreign flag increases the market value of the
ship.
2) Transfer reduces operating costs, particularly for wages and
maintenance of good working conditions, due to lower standards
permissible under foreign flags.
3) Transfer makes possible operating in world trade with easy
currency conversion.
4) Transfer allows the owner to avoid United States Coast Guard
requirements governing the condition of the vessel.
5) The owner may affect repairs abroad at less cost than the same
repairs in the United States.
6) The owner can save money by avoiding United States income
tax.
7) Ultimately, as a result of increased earnings, the owner's financial ability to acquire new tonnage is improved."'
Furthermore, registration of ships under flags of convenience is a very
simple process. In order to register a vessel, the person or corporation
wishing to do so does not have to go to the respective country. In the
United States, one may register a ship under the Liberian flag by con19. Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security?, 3 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 67, 68 (1980).
20. Id. at 72-73.
21. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 50.
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22
tacting the Liberian Consul or their shipping offices in New York City.
A registration fee and an annual fee based on tonnage are normally the
only charges made, and a guarantee or acceptable understanding regarding
future freedom from taxation may also be given.23
Construction and operating costs under a flag of convenience fall dramatically below the costs of a ship under American registration. Because
labor costs are higher in the United States than in Japan, for instance, a
typical 200,000 ton supertanker, which cost approximately $90 million
in the United states in 1977, could have been purchased for as little as
$40 million in Japan. 4 In addition, nations interested in having strong
commercial fleets provide government subsidies for construction. Therefore, American-owned corporations cannot realistically expect to build
their ships in the United States and still be able to compete with ships
built in other countries.
Relatively inexpensive labor to operate the vessel seems to be another
major reason for using flags of convenience. It has been estimated by
shipping interests that for a 50,000 ton tanker, a thirty-two man crew
would cost $1.7 million a year at 1977 American wages.' By using the
Liberian flag, a shipowner could hire crews of other nationalities at the
following 1977 rates: all-Italian, $600,000 a year; British, $500,000; or
Spanish, $450,000.26
One can conclude from the high costs of ship construction, maintenance, and operation in the United States that a United States registered
vessel cannot compete with foreign ships without substantial government
subsidy. U.S. operating costs are as much as 70 percent higher than those
of foreign registered vessels. The transportation of oil on the world market
is "intensely competitive. Hence, in the absence of governmental subsidization, United States oil tankers can remain competitive only by operating under flags of convenience. 27
Relative freedom from control by the country of registry is another
reason why flags of convenience are preferred. The vast majority of FCCs
are classified as developing or Third-World states. By definition they have
a lower standard of living and are less industrialized. Their economic
conditions are such that this method of income is acceptable and they
are, therefore, much less prone than developed countries to try to exercise
control over the powerful multinational corporations with which they do

22. Payne, supra note 19, at 70.
23. Id. at 70.
24. Recent Tanker Accidents. Part 1. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science
and Transportation. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. 79 (1977) (statement of R.J. Blackwell. Asst. Sec. for
Maritime Aff.. MarAd., Commerce Dept.).
25. Id. at 33 (statement by W.T. Coleman. Jr.. Sec. DOT.).
26. Id.
27. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1. at 51.
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business. It is unrealistic to expect these countries to enforce the stringent
standards required by the United States,28 because it would be contrary
to their economic development. Herein lies the major problem of flags
of convenience. Due to this lax control, fleets of ships bearing these flags
are characterized by inadequately trained crews and frequent collisions.
Too often this combination has resulted in disastrous oil spills.29
Oil Pollutionfrom Routine Discharges
Flags of convenience play a significant role in the continuing problem
of oil spills, but the major source of oil pollution continues to be the
deliberate pumping of oil into the sea by tankers.30 The vast majority of
ships use sea water as ballast subsequent to their deliveries of oil and,
prior to being refilled with oil, pump the ballast water back into the
oceans. In light of the fact that approximately one-fifth of the world's
merchant fleet is engaged in transporting oil, this method of disposing
of ballast water contributes significantly to ocean pollution. 3 Therefore,
while flag of convenience tankers per se cannot be viewed as the main
threat to oceans because of their accidents, it may be argued that since
flag of convenience ships are primarily responsible for transporting oil
to the United States and around the world, both sources of pollution may
be attributed to them. 32
For these reasons, international efforts have been mounted to eliminate
flag of convenience registry, but they face strong opposition from flag of
convenience nations and from the United States. Little has been accomplished to date. 3 Because of the abuse of international law by flag of
convenience ships, 34 some means of effectively holding polluters accountable must be developed. Most projections indicate that oil pollution
will be increasing as more offshore drilling, transportation of oil over the
seas, and storage and processing facilities along the coast are utilized.
This increased activity will be necessary to sustain the 3.3-4.4 percent
annual increase predicted in demand for oil. 5 The Global 2000 Report
to the President of the United States concluded:
More petroleum pollutants will enter the oceans. Proliferation of
onshore and offshore power plants will result in extensive use of
28. Payne. supra note 19, at 72.
29. Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1, at 40.
30. Payne, supra note 19, at 81.
31. Bergman. No-Fault Liabilit.yfor Oil Pollution Damage. 5 1. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 6 (1973).
32. Id. at 5
33. Note, Protection of the High Seas from OperationalOil Pollution:A Proposal. 6 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 72, 80 (1982-83).
34. Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1. at 40.
35. UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE
PRF.SIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ENTERING THE 21sT CENTURY (1980), [hereinafter referred to as
GLOBAL 20001.
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TABLE I
Best Estimates of Petroleum Hydrocarbons Introduced into the Oceans
Annually
Source
Natural seeps
Offshore production
Transportation
LOT tankers
Non-LOT tankers
Dry docking
Terminal operations
Bilges bunkering
Tanker accidents
Nontanker accidents
Coastal refineries
Atmosphere
Coastal municipal wastes
Coastal nonrefining industrial wastes
Urban runoff
River runoff
Total

Best
Estimate
0.6
0.08
0.31
0.77
0.25
0.003
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
1.6
6.113

Probable
Range
(millions of metric tons)
0.2-1.0
0.08-0.15
0.15-0.4
0.65-1.0
0.2-0.3
0.0015-0.005
0.4-0.7
0.12-0.15
0.02-0.15
0.2-0.3
0.4-0.8

0.1-0.5

Source: United States Council on Environmental Quality. THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., ENTERING THE 21st CENTURY (1980) p. 132.

oxidants and other biocides (especially chlorine) to prevent biological
fouling in cooling towers, entrainment, and thermal pollution, altering the habitat of marine organisms. The increased use of nuclear
energy may lead to accidental release or to deliberate disposal ofradioactive materials in the oceans. 6

This study states that the increased use of fossil fuels will aggravate
the existing problems of coastal zone degradation. The oil pollution from
routine discharges from tanker operations is greater in volume than pollution from oil spills, and will present a greater long-term threat to the
marine environment.37 See the estimates of quantities of hydrocarbons
entering the ocean annually in Table 1.
The general consensus is that oil pollution is likely to increase unless
immediate antipollution standards are implemented. The operational discharges are directly related to the levels of world trade in oil38 and to the
use of faulty vessels commonly protected by the flags of convenience
system.39 The expected rise in crude oil trade emphasizes the need for
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 121.
Id. at 132.
D. ABECASSIS. supra note 2. at 6.
Note, supra note 33, at 72.
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efforts to prevent oil pollution.' In confronting a problem of such magnitude, this article turns now to an examination of existing national and
international efforts to prevent oil pollution, as well as efforts involving
comparable problems.
MULTILATERAL EFFORTS AT OIL POLLUTION RESOLUTION
InternationalConventions
" International environmental problems are usually handled in the
manner
of comparable international disputes, by the United Nations and its numerous special agencies. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
is the agency responsible for marine pollution matters. It is among the
smallest of the United Nations' agencies and its predecessor, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), was established primarily as a "consultative and advisory" body.4 Nevertheless,
IMCO drafted most of the multilateral conventions on the protection of
the marine environment. The role of IMO today, like that of IMCO in
previous years, is strictly advisory. It may do no more than submit proposals for maritime pollution liability to states, and these states are free
to accept or reject them as binding conventions.4"
The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil was the first to be ratified. It adopted a zonal approach to
marine pollution in that it prohibited the discharge of oil within fifty miles
of land.43 In order for it to enter into force, assent was required by ten
governments, including five having not less than 500,000 gross tons of
tanker tonnage. While the United States, Liberia, and Panama were not
among the first to ratify, they have since done so." Each ship must carry
on board an oil record book, in the form provided by the Convention,
which may be inspected by the proper authorities of any contracting state.
Any violations must be reported to the government of the state of registry,
which is then obliged to exact appropriate penalties according to its
national laws. "5
In 1962 a conference was convened by IMCO to review this Convention. The conference adopted amendments extending this application to
vessels of smaller gross tonnage, and extending the prohibited zones
where no discharge is allowed. 46 As of 1980, there were fifty-two states
40. D. ABECASSIS. supra note 2. at 6; GLOBAL 2000, supra note 35.
41. Note. supra note 33. at 80, 81.
42. Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1. at 66, 67.
43. International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954. 12 U.S.T. 2989.
T.I.A.S. No. 4900. [hereinafter cited as 1954 Convention].
44. Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1, at 67.
45. 1954 Convention. supra note 43, art. II, VII, IX.
46. Bangladesh, Agricultural Commodities, Feb. 23. 1976. 27 U.S.T. 1515, 1523, T.I.A.S. No.
6109.
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party to the Convention, which accounts for 95 percent of the world
tanker fleet. 7
In 1969, IMCO promulgated the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil Liability Convention). It is the
primary convention relating to liability for accidental or intentional damage caused by oil pollution.48 The Civil Liability Convention is "a reaffirmation and elaboration of the general maritime law which imposes
liability for damages from oil pollution caused by a ship or the persons
responsible for the ship." 4 9 Although the Civil Liability Convention is a
serious attempt to provide a remedy for damages caused by oil pollution,
it applies only to damage caused in the territory of a signatory state.
When one considers the potential harm caused by the introduction of oil
into the marine environment, it becomes clear that "protection of the
world's beaches and protection of the marine ecology itself are not synonymous. "o
Also adopted in 1969 was the International Convention Relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (Intervention Convention). It granted contracting states the right to take
action against ships when casualties result in "major harmful consequences" to their coastline. 5 Amendments in 1971 established construction standards based upon the ship's dimensions, providing for
compartmentalization, limitations of tank sizes, and requirements involving the arrangement of tanks. However, neither of these amendments
has yet received adequate ratification to enter into force. 2
In 1973, IMCO confronted the problem of prevention of oil spills rather
than liability for those spills by adopting the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Pollution Convention), which
goes far beyond the provisions of the 1954 Convention and all of its
subsequent amendments. The Pollution Convention prohibits the discharge of any substance which is likely to create a hazard to human health
or to harm the living resources of the oceans. It applies not only to oil
tankers, but to all vessels operating on the oceans. 53
Despite the strength of the Pollution Convention with respect to territorial waters, it remains ineffective as to violations which occur on the
high seas. The observing state may notify the flag state of such incidents,
but it is then the responsibility of the flag state to take action. When the
47. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1. at 67.
48. Note, supra note 33. at 83.
49. Teclaff. International Law and the Protection of the Oceansfrom Pollution. 40 FORDHAM L.
REv. 529, 541 (1972).
50. Note. supra note 33. at 83.
51. Id. at 84.
52. Dempsey & Helling, supra note I. at 68.
53. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. 12 1.L.M. 1319
(1973).
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polluting ship flies a flag of convenience, there is simply no evidence
that flag states follow up with enforcement measures."
Draft Conventions on the Law of the Sea
Recent efforts to control marine pollution are embodied in the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea, created by the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS IlI)." UNCLOS III, convened in 1973, was the result of a United Nations General Assembly
Resolution calling for a
[c]onference on the law of the sea which would deal with the establishment of an equitable international regime ... for the area and
resources of the sea bed and the ocean floor .. and the preservation
of the marine environment, including ... the prevention of pollution ......
The Draft Convention addresses a wide range of ocean related issues,
including jurisdiction over territorial waters, areas of the oceans adjoining
territorial waters, and matters relating to the use of the high seas. Articles
213 through 236 call on contracting flag states to prohibit ships under
their registry from sailing unless they comply with domestic and international standards. However, their ability to do so is doubtful because
most flag states have such limited resources with which to monitor their
registrants. Moreover, the registered ships seldom if ever visit ports of
the flag state. 6 Article 235 implies that contracting states are responsible
for the fulfillment of their international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment but does not provide
any real penalties for states which fail to meet these obligations, nor does
it discourage flag of convenience registry.5 The provisions of the Draft
Convention, although significant in that they are not framed as isolated
responses to environmental problems, fail to establish an authority to
enforce obligations with respect to violations. 8 The multilateral efforts
presented here, while not a complete view of international response to
the marine oil pollution problem, are, however, a fair representation of
the general form of international legislation that has evolved over the last
thirty years.
54. Note, supra note 33, at 85.
55. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (Montego
Bay, Jamaica, Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS]. reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
UNCLOS codified existing international law and was signed by 117 nations, excepting the United
States.
56. Note. supra note 33. at 85. See also The Law of the Sea-Where Now?. 46 LAw & CoNTrMP.
PROBS.. quoting G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28 at 242 U.N. Doc. A/RES/2750
(1970).
57. Note, supra note 33, at 89.
58. Id.. quoting U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 78, art. 235(1) (1981).
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UNILATERAL EFFORTS AT OIL POLLUTION RESOLUTION
United States Law
The first significant attempt in the United States to enact comprehensive
legislation concerning tanker safety was the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act of 1972.59 It "attacked the problem of oil pollution prevention from
two directions: traffic control procedures, and vessel design and construction. " The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 holds the
vessel owner "strictly liable without regard to fault ... for all damages,
including clean up costs, sustained by any person or entity ...as a result
of discharges of oil" from vessels.6' The Deepwater Port Act of 1974
prohibits oil discharges from any of the facilities of the port or from any
vessel operating to or from the port in a surrounding area technically
denominated a "safety zone."62 The owner or licensee is subject to unlimited liability if it can be shown that the discharge occurred because
of "gross negligence or willful misconduct within [his] privity and knowledge." 63 Absent such a showing, the limitation is $50 million for the
licensee64 and the lesser of $150 per ton or $20 million for the vessel
owner.
In 1978, Congress enacted the most comprehensive and far reaching
marine pollution prevention legislation in United States history, the Port
and Tanker Safety Act, which provided for civil and criminal penalties
so that "the vessel shall be liable and proceeded against wherever found."'65
The Secretary of Transportation is given investigatory powers, and the
power to condition entry to ports of the United States. He also is given
broad power to issue, amend, or repeal regulations relating to, among
other things, cargo holds or tanks; handling or storage of cargo; duties,
qualifications, and training of the officers and crew of a vessel; and the
reduction or elimination of discharges during ballasting, deballasting,
tank cleaning, cargo handling, or other such activity.'6
"[U]nited States law regarding liability for oil pollution has proceeded
at an irregular pace, providing what may fairly be characterized as a
patchwork scheme of liability limits, legal defenses, and compensation
fund programs. ,67 It currently attempts to reconcile its domestic programs
with international programs on its own terms, and refuses to cooperate
59. Id.
60. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584, 43 U.S.C.. § 1651-55 (1976).
61. Dempsey & Helling. supra note I. at 76.
62. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1509(d) (1982).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(d) (1982 & Supp. Il 1985).
64. Dempsey & Helling, supra note I,at 485. quoting 33 U.S.C. 88 1517(d)-(e) (1976).
65. 46 U.S.C. § 391(c) (1982).
66. Dempsey & Helling. supra note I. at 79-81.
67. Mendelsohn & Fidell, LiabiliYfor Oil Pollution-UnitedStates Law, 10 J. MAR. L. CoNNM.
475, 496 (1979).
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with the world community in ratifying many of the major multilateral
conventions now pending before it.'
The United States has recently enacted more regulations which attempt
to foster marine safety by requiring certain notice from vessels entering
the territorial waters of the United States.' The vessels must give notice
of their beneficial owners, notice of whether or not they are carrying oil
or other dangerous cargo, and they must provide proof of financial responsibility for clean up costs or other damages which might be caused
by the ship.7"
British Legislation
The United Kingdom enacted a series of statutes dealing with oil pollution, several of which represent domestic enactments of international
conventions. The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 197 1' enables the British
government to take action against any ship in its territorial waters that
has caused an oil pollution casualty, regardless of the ship's registry.72
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1971" (Oil Pollution Act) enacts into
British law the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. 7' The Oil Pollution Act provides for strict liability imposed
on the owner of the ship, regardless of state of registry, and denies access
to British ports that do not comply by showing a required certification
of adequate insurance coverage.75 The Merchant Shipping Act of 197476
is an enactment of the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Polhition Damage.77 The
Act establishes a fund to compensate any victim of oil pollution damage
who is unable to obtain complete recovery from the party liable under
the Oil Pollution Act.78
The United Kingdom's legal regime corresponds very closely to the
international framework. The victim is provided with as complete compensation as possible, and liability is placed on the parties who most
fairly should bear it, the ship owner and the owner of the oil cargo.7 9
68. Dempsey & Helling, supra note I, at 84.
69. 33 C.F.R. § 161 (1985).
70. 33 C.F.R. §§ 135.401, 137.301-05 (1985).
71. 1971, ch. 21, 41 HALSBURY'S STATUES at 1330, amending previous acts of 1955 and 1963
that give effect to the 1954 International Pollution Convention in the United Kingdom.
72. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 72.
73. 1971, ch. 59, HALSBURY'S STATUES at 1345.
74. 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970).
75. Dempsey & Helling, supra note 1, at 72.
76. 1974. ch. 43, 44 HALSBURY'S STATUES at 1361.
77. 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972).
78. Dempsey & Helling, supra note I, at 72, 73.
79. Id.
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The "Superfund" Compensation System
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liabilities
Act of 1982, popularly termed "Superfund," is a progressive step towards
a solution to the hazardous waste site problem. 8' The main drawback is
that it comes into operation after the harm has occurred. This act has
been criticized for failing to provide a mechanism for compensation of
injured parties, in that there is no method to receive payment for damages
caused by abandoned or inactive sites. The history of the Act indicates
that several Superfund packages did provide substantial relief for third
parties. However, Congress compromised in enacting the present act
because of the expense of maintaining the fund if such relief were insured. 8'
Under the Superfund method, manufacturers of petrochemical feedstocks and toxic organic chemicals, and importers of crude oil pay into
a trust fund to be used in certain qualified cases. Theoretically the fund
should be a deterrent to oil pollution. In reality, this deterrent is illusory
because companies feel insulated by this payment plan and may not elect
to actively prevent oil pollution, especially pollution that is commonly
accepted as operational.
The operational oil pollution caused by routine discharges has a cumulative long-term hazardous effect on the total environment. This effect
will not be directly covered by Superfund which concentrates primarily
on major oil spills or hazardous waste sites. Furthermore, sites targeted
for clean up by use of Superfund monies have not to date been worked
on at all, and there is evidence to suggest that technology is not advanced
enough to treat such sites adequately even when the assigned task is
undertaken. 82 This technological problem, combined with lack of other
resources such as trained specialists and the probability of inadequate
funds, makes the Superfund solutions somewhat idealistic.
The Superfund legislation has been advanced as a breakthrough in
dealing with pollution problems, but it should not be relied on in any
sense to prevent pollution or to cure the problem, once created. Once oil
pollution occurs, either from spills or routine discharges, no amount of
money can fully restore the environment to its prior state. There are also
inherent problems of enforcement of legislation such as Superfund and
other after-the-fact remedies.
Reliance on a system of liability to overcome oil pollution has a number
80. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9630 et seq. (1982).
81. Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund. 68 VA.
L. REV. 1157, 1169 (1982); Note, Hazardous Waste: Third-Pary Compensationfor Contingencies
Arising from Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposi Sites. 33 S.C.L. REv. 543, 547
(1982).
82. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 156-57 (1982).
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of shortcomings.8 3 Oil pollution from tankers affects common waters, the
ocean and coastal areas, which often makes it difficult to prove individual
and other damages because states and nations are limited by their territorial
waters. Identifying the source vessel of pollution is another problem. Due
to these problems of establishing liability, the compensation of victims
preferably should be accomplished through modifications of Superfund
legislation whereby victims would be paid out of funds established by
the oil industry. 4 Explicit protection of third parties, and an equitable
statute of limitations should be added to such a system to make it credible.
The Current Liability System
The Tanker Owner's Voluntary Agreement on Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), created by seven major oil companies in 1970, reimburses
national governments for preventative and clean up costs incurred as a
result of a tanker spillage.85 Over 99 percent of the world's privatelyowned vessels are members of TOVALOP, but it places limits on liability
and gives no assurance to governments of enforcement. A supplementary
agreement in 1971 called The Contract Regarding an Interim Settlement
to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) involved thirty-eight
companies and provided compensation for direct damages with a liability
limit of $36 million per incident. 6
Tankers under flags of convenience are not properly operated or maintained and are often involved in oil spill accidents and purposeful discharges. Yet, the country licensing the flag of convenience ships exerts.
little or no authority over such vessels and damages, even if assessed,
are usually not paid. Additionally, although nations assess fines for violation of their oil pollution laws pertaining to tankers, the fines often
are so low that they simply may not fulfill a deterrence function. 7
Civil liability for oil pollution damage is usually based on theories of
negligence, nuisance, trespass, strict liability, or state statutory claims.
"Because a victim of oil pollution may be left without a remedy if oil
pollution causes damage in excess of the liability coverage of a vessel,
strict liability has been utilized to reach owners and operators of vessels
and onshore and offshore related facilities."8 8 This trend demonstrates
83. R. STEWART & J.KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 46-64 (Sup. 1982).
84. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF
LIABILITY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS RELATED TO OIL POLLUTION (1970) (A study for the
U.S. Coast Guard) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS].
85. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil: Amendments to the Convention of 1954. Reprinted

in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970).
86. Becker, Acronyms and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage from Tankers, 18 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 475-79 (1983).
87. OIL POLLUTION. A SURVEY OF WORLDWIDE LEGISLATION (E.Gold ed. 1978).
88. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL AsPECTS, supra note 75, at 2.2-2.7.
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that the initial risk of loss is placed on the oil industry. As noted earlier,
however, the cost will be passed on to the consumer insofar as that is
possible. 89 Therefore, even expanding liability of polluters will not necessarily burden only the producer, and such after-the-fact solutions will
not stop pollution at its incipiency.
United States and international laws regarding liability for oil pollution
have resulted in a patchwork scheme of compensation programs, legal
defenses, and limits on liability. In the United States, this pattern is even
further confused by the constitutional restrictions upon states' powers to
legislate in an area that involves federal legislation. The existence of
diverse geographical and industrial areas subject to oil pollution and lack
of coherence between national and international laws emphasizes the need
to construct a framework of global controls or charges for pollution."
Charges for pollution give recognition to the common heritage of mankind, as all individuals regardless of nationality share the global commons. 9' A charge system also allows coastal areas to preserve their interests
in a regulatory system which will foster trade and attempt to compensate
the public for use of the common property.
PROPOSALS
Problems With Existing Efforts
Despite international attempts to control oil pollution, pollution of the
sea by oil continues to grow and this growth, of course, is caused mainly
by waste disposal at sea,92 deballasting,93 and major spills.' Regulations
are slowly formed and, to date, have been largely ineffective.9 5 The United
89. Id.

90. D.

CUISINE & J. GRANT, THE IMPACT OF MARINE POLLUTION 310 (1980).
9!. Lahey, Economic Chargesfor EnvironmentalProtection:Ocean Dumping Fees. II ECOLOGY
L.Q. 305, 315 (1984) (defining collective goods, such as clean air or water, as an environmental
amenity).
92. O'Halloran, Ocean Dumping: ProgressToward a Rational Policy of DredgedWaste Disposal.
12 ENvmL. L. 745 (1982); see also City of New York v. EPA. 543 F.Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Marine Protection. Research. and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (1982).
93. Deballasting is the single greatest source of oil or other pollution of the ocean, contributing
80 to 85 percent of the several million tons of oil spilled yearly. See R.. M*GONIGLE & M. ZACHER.
POLLUTION. POLITICS. AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: TANKERS AT SEA 14-20 (1979); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, OIL TRANSPORTATION BY TANKERS: AN ANALYSIS OF MARINE POLLUTION (1975); see

also Note, supra note 33; Dempsey & Helling. supra note 1. at 42 n. 15.
94. See Smets, The Oil Spill Risk: Economic Assessment and Compensation Limit. 14 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 23 (1983); see also Hancock and Stone, Liabilit.yforTransnationalPollution Caused by
Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 377 (1982).
95. Comment, The Impediments to Effective Regulation of Oil Tanker Traffic in United States
Waters, 51 U. CoLo. L. REv. 77 (1979); Note. The Clean WaterAct of 1977: Expanded Competence
Over Vessel Source Pollution, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 289 (1978); Dellapenna & Wang. Protectingthe
Republic of Chinafrom Oil Pollution in the Sea: Accounting for Damagesfrom Oil Spills. 19 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 115 (1984), citing, Note The InternationalEnvironmental Law of the Sea: The Canadian
Arctic Waters PollutionAct and Its Effects. 1970-1980. 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 139 (1980).
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Nations Conventions have required each ratifying nation to participate
by adopting rigid procedural safeguards against pollution and insuring
that necessary steps be taken to enforce these safeguards.96 The nations
are supposed to enforce such standards against ships flying their flags,
using their ports, and passing through their territorial waters.97
Some states have used the Convention's delegation of power to enforce
the international standards against ships that give evidence of a violation
by causing or threatening to cause damage to the resources in the state's
exclusive economic zone. 98 The main limitation faced by these states in
exercising such jurisdiction over ships not flying their flag is that the state
is subject to flag-state preemption. Flag-state preemption is the mandatory
suspension of any proceeding by a coastal state for a violation beyond
its territorial seas if the flag state involved takes action within six months.
Furthermore, significant burdens of proof are required to establish offenses, such as proof the offense was committed by a particular ship and
proof the ship was in violation of existing standards; then the ship must
be freed upon posting of bond. Beyond this, states cannot impose standards concerning the construction, design, equipment, or manning of
ships because it interferes with innocent passage." Finally, international
standards limit a ship's liability to $160 per ton or a maximum of
$16,800,000, which may be supplemented by other agreements aggregating up to $85 million coverage."
Statistics indicate that only a small percentage of all tankers are responsible for the operational oil pollution problem. It is estimated that
90 percent of the oil discharged from routine tanker operations comes
from approximately 20 percent of all tankers.'°' Industry attempts have
been made to reduce the~e operational discharges by implementing specific discharge procedures, providing for specific designs in new tanker
02
construction, and requiring monitoring and control of tanker discharge.
This industry initiative has contributed improvements to the operational
oil pollution problem such as the Load-on-Top method. 0 3 The Load-on96. Phillips. The Economic Resources Zone-Progress for the Developing Coastal States. I I J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 349 (1980).

97. UNCLOS. supra note 55. at arts. 217, 218, 211(4), 220(2).
98. Id. at art. 220(3). The exclusive economic zone is the shoreline zone where discharge of oil
into the sea is prohibited. The United States claims such protective domain outside of its exclusive
fishing zone. See 33 U.S.C. 1321 (1982).
99. UNCLOS, supra note 55. at arts. 228. 220(5). 220(6). 220(7). 21(2). See Stanford, Canadian
Perspectives on the Future Enforcement of the Exclusive Economic Zone: A Paper in Diplomacy and
the Law of the Sea. 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 73. 81-88 (1979); see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-32 (1982).
100. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil: Amendments to the Convention of 1954, Oct.
21. 1969. arts. II, III. 28 U.S.T. 1205. T.I.A.S. No. 8505, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) (this
Convention has not been ratified by the United States but has been in force since 1977).
101. LEGAL. ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS. supra note 84.

102. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 2. at 28-30.
103. Id. at 42; D. CUISINE & J. GRANT. supra note 90, at 41, citing MARINE DIvISION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE. THE BATTLE AGAINST OIL POLLUTION AT SEA 3 (1976).
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Top method was introduced in 1964 by the major oil companies to reduce
oily discharges. It is now used by over 85 percent of the world's tankers.
Basically, this method drains oil that.collects on top of the water to be
drained underneath, thus reducing the oil discharged into the ocean.
Despite these efforts, strong international leadership is needed in combating the operational oil pollution problem. All nations are affected to
some degree by oil pollution, and there can be little argument that responsible action to control it would have widespread benefit to the marine
environment, human health, commercial and sport fishing, quality of
ocean water, and global amenities available. " While concern for the
problem has produced a blizzard of paper solutions, the economic interests
of nations that hold the key to a solution are the principal obstacle to
achieving one.
The "tragedy of the commons," a phrase now synonymous with abuse
of free or unpriced goods by individuals and business firms, is well
illustrated by the problem of ocean pollution.'0 5 The system makes it
profitable to continue to pollute the ocean. This international economic
reality is fairly simple. The routine pollution of the ocean through oil
discharges is less expensive than taking steps to make certain that the oil
is placed in ecologically safe disposal facilities and that the ship and crew
are capable of meeting the environmental challenge.
The following analysis adopts the view that the quality of the environment is a valuable resource and should be treated appropriately.'o6 An
economic analysis brings to the forefront the conflicting rights of individuals, multi-national energy firms, and nation-states, and serves as a
tool to explain the interaction of market forces. Insights gained through
this examination help in the development of legal solutions to the problems
of protecting the quality of the environment. The effects of suggested
legal reforms to deal with pollution, such as pollution from oil tankers,
may then be evaluated in economic terms.
The role of economic analysis is to outline the basic relationships and
responses between the parties involved. It is instrumental in devising
governmental or institutional policies or changes, if needed. Institutional
policies directed towards protecting environmental quality necessarily
must be evaluated in terms of the demand to produce wealth and income,
and support the technologically advanced society, in this case illustrated
by the demand for oil. 0 7 Degradation of the ocean by oil pollution is
primarily an example of a negative externality, or "side-effect" of the
transport of oil. Nevertheless, some side-effects are attributable to care104.
105.
106.
(1973).
107.

G. TIMARGIS, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION (1980).
G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243. 4348 (Dec. 1968).
1. HrE. H. MACAULEY, J. STEPP & B. YANDLE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
Id. at 11.

QUALITY
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lessness or ignorance and are not necessary. An unnecessary cost related
to pollution by oil tankers is the careless operation of equipment by tanker
crews. Such an identified side-effect may be addressed directly, through
supervision or training of crewmen, or indirectly, through elimination of
the flag of convenience registry system.
If oil pollution is to be reduced through specific measures, such as the
elimination of flag of convenience registry and the reduction of operational
discharges, the improvement of current practices must be insured by the
strategic use of economic incentives and charges.' This judgment is
amply supported by the foregoing analysis which can be summed up by
saying that, under present arrangements it is simply cheaper for international oil firms to continue to pollute. The current flag of convenience
licensing system allows countries to profit from licensing ships to operate
without basic safety requirements, and promotes registration of faulty
tankers and untrained crews. If a company owns ships which are older
and unsafe, this system provides an incentive to allow the ship to deteriorate and sail under a flag of convenience rather than to upgrade and
improve the tanker."
Similarly, the current system encourages tankers to continue cleaning
and ballasting their ships, routinely allowing the oily debris to contaminate
the ocean. The present market does not penalize the tank operators for
following this routine procedure. Although it is technically feasible to
avoid this problem simply by pumping this oily discharge into inland
holding ponds, the economic incentives do not exist presently to support
such an improvement. Therefore, although practicality dictates that production and transportation of oil must encompass some environmental
damages, .these environmental costs may be lowered without undue restrictions on the continued use of oil. The task essentially is to structure
decisions that impact environmental quality in such a way that they enhance the long-term integrity of the environment rather than the shortterm economic prospects of the firm.
Whether a proposed change is implemented, such as requiring tankers
to discharge their oily debris into holding ponds, will depend on the
relative costs and benefits assigned to the action. For example, in a case
where the cost to the polluter of using the holding ponds is greater than
the benefits from that use, there will be no inducement to spend money
on a total containment type system. In fact it is probably too much to
expect firms in a competitive industry to be guided by altruistic motives
when the consequences of such behavior, more costs than benefits, will
make them uncompetitive with rival firms that are not so inclined. There108. Note. Deterring Air Polluters Through Economically Efficient Sanctions: A Proposalfor
Amending the Clean Air Act, 32 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1980).
109. Note, supra note 33.
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foie, if a legal constraint such as a land-based depository is imposed,
and this constraint structures operations with goals other than optimization
of oil production, it must be uniformly enforced by a multinational body.
Determining whether a containment system should be utilized and, if so,
how implemented, involves social policy considerations regarding who
should bear the costs involved."'0
One suggestion to allocate costs of oil pollution would be to force the
polluter alone to internalize these costs because the pollution is a sideeffect of its operations. This .alternative fails to account for the reciprocal
nature of social costs, however. After all, consumer demands for reduced
prices encourage producers to minimize or avoid expenditures on pollution
control devices. The longer these expenditures are postponed, the greater
will be the sum of accumulated increment; eventually this will prove too
much for the environment to assimilate. The cost of controlling pollution,
then, is an expenditure demanded by a subsequent generation of consumers for whom preservation of water quality is more important than
low prices. Therefore, polluting firms and the consuming public should
be jointly responsible and charged for the cost of preventing pollution."'
Current legislation clearly identifies the producer as responsible for
pollution and forces the firm to pay for pollution as another expense of
business operations. 1"2 Then, to the extent that the market will permit,
this expense is pushed forward to consumers. But simply forcing the oil
polluter to pay for the externality of oil pollution through liability for oil
spills does not address the task of preventing environmental harm. This
is a crucial problem because many attempts to identify and allocate costs
of oil pollution operate under the false assumption that all pollution is a
necessary byproduct of operations. 3 At a minimum, stiff penalties should
be imposed for routine, unnecessary pollution.
Because the commons area of the ocean cannot be fenced, a plausible
strategy is one that makes it cheaper for the polluter to take action to
preserve the water quality than to continue to pollute. Pollution taxes
answer this need. If levied fairly and uniformly by an international body,
shipping firms can decide for themselves on the basis of cost alternatives
whether it is cheaper to pay the tax or to undergo the expense of revamping
their operations and avoid the tax. The concept of private property encourages exploitation of "free" goods (The Commons), and this conduct
results in long-term harm to others. But a tax on each unit of pollution
induces some shippers to avoid pollution while, at the same time, building
110. Comment. Water Law-Cessation of Return Flow as a Means of Complying with Pollution
Control Laws. 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 431 (1977); see Coase. The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
111. Coase. supra note 110, at 41.
112. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251. 131 l(a) (1982).
113. LEGAL, ECONOMIC. AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS, supra note 84.
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a "clean-up" fund to address the problems created by those who continue
to pollute.
Despite the agreements embodied in international conventions, many
are not widely accepted or enforced. Stringent enforcement is not followed
because the nations must balance their desire to enhance freedom of
navigation for commercial purposes and their desire to protect their natural
resources, particularly in coastal zones, from oil pollution." 4 Political
compromises must be effected between nations that interact frequently
and share commercial interests in oil shipments." 5 There must be firm
international commitment to abolish the flags of convenience and to provide adequate reception facilities for oil discharge from tank cleaning and
ballasting. The responsibility for and costs of controlling oil pollution
must be shared by those receiving the benefits, to assure that no one
segment of society bears the unfair burden of having pollution costs forced
upon it.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Most economists regard natural resources such as the ocean as a property resource."6 The pollution of the ocean by oil, then, is viewed as a
market failure because the market has not attached an appropriate price
for its use or degradation. A charge system or a pollution tax places the
burden of paying for the use or degradation of the ocean on the party
benefitting from its use or degradation. Lacking this, the common resource
will be freely abused and exploited. External or spillover effects impose
the cost of abuse on other people. In the case of oil pollution, selfinterested individuals and firms will continue to exploit the'natural resources of water and coastal areas, causing spillover costs on others unless
charged a fee." 7
The Charge System
Market solutions, such as the charge system, are generally less coercive
than other alternatives because they utilize motives of self-interest to
promote social goals while allowing freedom of choice in action."' Some
economists also advance the charge system as flexible and adaptable." 9
114. D. CUISINE & J. GRANT, supra note 90, at 95-115.
115. Id. at 95.
116. Lahey, supra note 91, at 315.
117. See J. DALES. POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 93-100 (1968); Lahey, supra note 91, at

318.
118. C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 16-18 (1977); Lahey, supra note 91,

at 318.
119. Russell, Economics and MarinePollution in IMPACT OF MARINE POLLUTION ON SocIErY 284,

287 (1982); Lahey, supra note 91, at 318.
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Other supporters would argue that it is an appropriate system because it
is fair, that is, it attempts to measure the use of the environment in
economic terms. Since those benefitting from pollution are compelled to
pay, this system generates a just result while, at the same time, compelling
an efficient one.
The charge system must be evaluated in comparison to other possible
approaches. For example, oil pollution from tankers has not been successfully controlled by direct government regulation, which is the method
now in operation. Most supporters of the charge system argue that it is
more cost efficient than direct regulation. 20 This is founded in the belief
that a charge system gives the polluter flexibility and incentive to develop
less expensive and alternative waste systems. Direct regulation, it has
been argued, stifles the creativity and initiative of firms desiring to develop
sophisticated technologies that will combat pollution. 12'
The charge system is appropriate to control operational oil pollution,
that is, caused by the flag of convenience ships. Parties who wish to pay
the charge to continue the present methods of tanker operations under
flags of convenience would be assessed an amount for the right to exercise
that choice. This charge would force the polluting firm to pay for the
pollution it is causing. Thus, the polluter will choose this option only if
it is economically worthwhile to him. The charge system here is preferable
because technological advancements in routine tanker operations and construction should not be stifled by direct government regulation which
involves slow rulemaking and enforcement. The charge system is an
appropriate way to address the flag of convenience system because it
allows freedom of choice for those nations and firms that find it profitable
to continue to utilize flags of convenience.
Social Costs and Purpose
Ideally, the charge system should reflect the actual price of pollution,
the social cost imposed by the polluter. Social cost in this example would
be equal to the external, spillover costs created by the polluter whose use
of the common property imposes a cost/detriment on others, such as a
reduction in the quality of the ocean. Determining this rate would involve
determining the amount of harm caused by each marginal unit of oil
discharged.
This method would be practical in dealing with pollution from routine
120. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC PROPERTY 85-91 (1975); Lahey,
supra note 91, at 316.
121. Mills & White, Government Policies TowardsAutomobile Emission Control. in APPROACHES
TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUtmON 348 (1978); Lahey, supra note 91, at 316; Stewart, Regulation.
Innovation. and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1259 (1981);
Russell. supra note 119, at 187.
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tank operations. For example, if environmentally sound tanker construction methods are followed, and if the oily ballast is pumped into inland
holding ponds, there would be nominal pollution from operational discharges. The polluter that retains a ship with faulty construction, and
purposefully discharges oily ballast into the ocean through routine operations such as cleaning, should be charged for each marginal unit of
discharge. This would be difficult to determine without detailed records
of oil cargoes and close surveillance of tankers. If, however, the amount
of oil discharged was determined to be 1,000 barrels, then the polluter
would be charged the cost of this pollution at a specified rate, perhaps
$20 per barrel. Unfortunately, this method is difficult to implement because of the problems of quantifying environmental damage. 2 It would
require estimates and subjective judgments of such damages.
Another method is to compare the costs of the preferred tanker construction and operations with the savings obtained through noncompliance
and then assess a pollution charge equal to the savings. For example, it
may cost $10 per ton to convert a tanker for safer operation and to routinely
discharge oily ballast into holding ponds, while a tanker firm that chose
not to comply with these measures would have only a $2 per ton cost of
operations. Therefore, the charge for non-compliance could be based on
the $8 differential, with the noncomplying tanker firm then charged $8
per ship per ton penalty for non-compliance.
This method is easier to implement, because figures could be arrived
at to determine the basic differential to apply to different types of ships.
The money collected from such charges could then be utilized to reimburse
the governments internationally for special services related to enforcing
the charge and for their support of construction of environmentally sound
on-shore disposal facilities. These revenues also could be used to finance
research in this area and in other ocean protection efforts. In essence, the
charge is a payment for the use of the ocean, and should be applied
towards correcting or improving its environment. This polluter-pays approach is currently used in many areas. For example, France uses it to
maintain or improve water quality; 123 the United States uses it to finance
environmental protection from oil spills due to off-shore drilling accidents;'24 and Japan uses charges to generate revenue to compensate victims
of pollution."2
122. Sagoff, Economic TheorY and Environmental Law, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 1393 (1981); Lahey,
supra note 91, at 319.
123. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLLUTION CHARGES IN
PRACTnCE 22-30 (1980); Lahey, supra note 82, at 321.
124. See Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (1982); Lahey, supra note
91. at 321.
125. Gresser, The 1973 JapaneseLawfor the Compensation ofPollution Related HealthDamage:
An IntroductoryAssessment, 5 ENvTL. L. REv. (1975); Lahey, supra note 91, at 322.
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Alternative Optionsfor Prevention of Oil Pollution
The United States and the world have a number of alternatives for
reducing future oil pollution. Three options to be discussed here are
elimination of flags of convenience, a system of economic charges to
penalize polluters, and a program of monetary incentives to encourage
controls. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and could be
adopted in any combination. Whether implemented together or individually, each option would contribute substantially to preventing future oil
discharges.
Elimination of Flags of Convenience
The termination of the use of flags of convenience will be costly to
oil producers who currently rely on outdated tanker fleets. When poor
crew and maintenance standards are no longer acceptable for any ship,
then the level of competition will be altered. Firms that utilize modern
fleets will no longer be forced to compete with ships with lower costs
due to unsafe vessels and untrained crews. The nations previously benefitting from the present lax registration requirements will no longer be in
the preferred situation to gain income with no corresponding gain in
responsibility.
Countries like the United States have advantageously farmed out vessels
as flag of convenience ships when they were in poor shape. 126 However,
any country that did not take advantage of this opportunity was not
realistically competing with others for the business served by such lowquality transportation. Elimination of the flag of convenience system will
raise the lowest available costs of transportation, but this is an acceptable
cost because it will simultaneously increase the quality of the transportation as ships are forced into compliance with new safety and environmental requirements.
A Fee System to Penalize Discharges
Oil pollution can be reduced significantly by the use of economic
incentives to assure that polluters are motivated to change their practices.
Tankers and other polluters should be required to pay in proportion to
the oil pollution they cause. Incentives should be offered to companies
to help overcome capital and other barriers to installation of equipment
to prevent unnecessary discharges. A pollution fee would instill the system
with a bottom-line economic discipline, while incentives link compliance
with the economic well-being of the firm.
Implementation of a pollution charge system obviously requires a sys126. Note. supra note 33.
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tem for monitoring the amounts of oil lost to the ocean on any given trip.
Much of the needed framework and equipment for such monitoring is
already available. There are well-established systems for gauging losses
from tankers using Load-on-Top operation.' 27 As a result of increasing
use of this procedure, there has been substantial progress toward the
development of reliable and reasonably accurate shipboard monitors.'
Establishing a system of in-port inspections, which can be double-checked
by auditing the transporter's oil record book, should provide a reasonably
accurate monitoring record that can form the basis of a fee system.'129
30
While IMCO has no monitoring and enforcement at the present time,
the tools are available for these tasks.
With a reliable monitoring procedure in place, a fee system would
simply impose a charge on each transporter per unit of oil discharged.
The appropriate level of such a charge may require some trial and error,
in setting a rate high enough to deter most oil pollution but not so high
as to discourage the shipping of oil or unduly raise prices. 3' International
experience with similar fee systems has demonstrated their workability.' 32
To be completely effective, a fee system would require international
implementation. However, even acting alone, the United States could go
far toward remedying oil pollution of the ocean. Dr. Mark Zacher, director
of the Institute of International Relations at the University of British
Columbia, emphasized recently that it "is now possible for the United
States, as it was never possible for the United States in the past, to police
the major pollution control procedure in its own ports. This is a very,
very important step."'' 33 The United States imports approximately 25
percent of all foreign petroleum production, and all oil companies and
tanker owners strongly desire 'access to the U.S. market." Hence, even
unilateral action by the United States could have a substantial world-wide
impact on the oil pollution problem.
Even more important, the mere threat of unilateral U.S.. action could
induce development of an international regime of pollution charges. Past
127. Oil Tanker Pollution: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 34-59 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Oil Tanker Pollution Hearings].
128. Id. at 110 (statement of William Gray, Exxon Corp.). Mr. Gray went on to suggest that
the monitors at that time (1978) might not be adequate for precise monitoring of discharges. Id.
Any such shortcomings, however, are primarily due to lack of pressure to perfect such devices, and
an accurate monitor is within the reach of technology if resources are devoted to its development.
Id. at 204 (testimony of Mark Zacher, University of British Columbia).
129. Oil Tanker Pollution Hearings, supra note 127.
130. Id. at 128 (testimony of Rear Adm. William Benkert, U.S. Coast Guard).
131. Roberts & Stewart, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1644, 1653 (1975).
132. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULnzE, supranote 120; ANDERSON Er. AL.. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT
THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1976).
133. Id.
134. J. HITE, supra note 106, at 104-07.
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prospects of unilateral action by America have prompted some reforms
by flag of convenience governments.' 35 Tanker owners themselves will
have an economic incentive to promote internationalization of any U.S.
program, to avoid the costs of complying with different standards applicable to United States and non-United States importing.' 36 Indeed, it has
been suggested that the "threat of U.S. unilateral action has been the
driving force for all recent IMCO actions."' 3 7 Regardless of whether
America's acts to control oil pollution prompt effective global responses,
U.S. adoption of a charge system will itself ameliorate much of this
growing problem. Another economic measure would entail a steep charge
to all tankers that do not comply with certain preferred methods of pollution control. For example, this would make it economically attractive
for the firm to adopt the practice of discharge into inland ponds. 3 ' The
purpose of a charge is to assess the polluting firm for the burden imposed
on society. Proponents of a charge system urge that it promotes efficient
use of resources by forcing the user to pay for consumption of the environment; balancing the cost the polluter pays with the contribution he
will be able to make; and not allowing a gain or profit at the expense of
society's interest in the environment.' 3 9
Incentivesfor Development of Reception Facilities
The international concern for insuring that the quality of the environment is protected necessitates action which will give immediate, measurable relief from oil pollution. Creation of inland reception/holding
facilities is one recommendation that meets that demand. Even if no
location is available at a particular port, an alternative to such land-based
facilities is the use of decommissioned tankers as moveable holding ponds
until more permanent facilities are established. "4Previous international
conventions have sought such reception facilities, yet subscribing nations
did not follow through with implementing the recommendations.' 4' For
example, Article VIII of the 1954 Convention provided that governments
would insure the provision in each main port of facilities adequate for
receiving residues from oily ballast water. 4 2
The procedure of pumping the oily ballast to shore facilities is technically possible and could prove profitable once implemented. The pro135. Oil Tanker PollutionHearings. supra note 127, at 211.
136. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Burton).
137. Id. at 127 (testimony of Rear Adm. Benkert on reforms by the governments of Liberia,
Panama, and others).
138. Id. at 201-02 (testimony of Dr. Zacher).
139. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Burton).
140. D. ABECASSIS, supra note 2, at 42.
141. Id. at 35.
142. Id. at 35, citing USA (Cmnd. 1677) and Liberia (Cmnd. 1806).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 27

cedure has not been widely used, however, for three main reasons: 1) the
high costs associated with installing inland shore systems; 2) the premium
of dock space in harbors, and 3) the increased layover time necessary to
discharge ballast in this manner. Nevertheless, the system is currently
working efficiently for at least one major oil company that found layover
time did not increase appreciably. "' There are inevitable startup problems
and learning costs, but these will contribute to routine, efficient, and less
costly layovers over time. These costs should be subsidized by international governments because of the tremendous importance of insuring
that the system be implemented.
To begin the implementation of sound procedures, special areas of
environmental sensitivity should be targeted for action first. The areas
targeted for the implementation of reception facilities should include the
five regions identified in the MARPOL convention and adopted by the
1973 Intergovernmental Maritime Consultation conference on Marine
Pollution-the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Red
Sea, and the Arabian-Persian Gulf.'" These areas are subject to heavy
vessel traffic and exposed to great environmental risk. For this reason
they are designated for rigid procedural safeguards and monitoring in an
effort to prevent further degradation. 45
' These efforts should be subsidized
by international governments because of the global benefits from the oil
transported through these areas.
After internationally subsidized set-up costs and learning curve costs
are paid for, the holding pond system would be self-financed because the
by-product of the system, the salvageable oil, would be valuable to the
second user. The Maritime Administration Office of Intermodel Systems
(MAOIS) has studied the issue and collected data concerning the requirements of ships in certain areas and the available port facilities.' 46
Business firms would be encouraged to participate in such arrangements
as a means of avoiding the type of pollution control legislation they have
been confronted with in the past, the type that places the costs on business
and subjects firms to heavy noncompliance penalties.' Business people
have argued that most pollution control programs do not contribute positively to the shareholders' return on investment and, correspondingly,
burden corporate resources and ultimately the public.' Subsidies are a
143. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS, supra note 84. at 18-3.
144. K. HAKAPAI, MARINE POLLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: MATERIAL OBLIGATIONS

AND JURISDICTIONS, EXCEPTIONALLY VULNERABLE SEA AREA: INTERNATINAL ARRANGEMENTS 250 (1981).

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 250-55.

LEGAL. ECONOMIC. AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS, supra note 84, at 18-3.
J. HrIE. supra note 106, at 99.
Id. at 100; see SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS AND CLEAN RIVER RESTORATION ACT OF 1966. S. REP. No. 1367, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1966).
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method to help business overcome the initial capital investment needed
for implementing pollution control.' 49 However, continuous subsidies,
especially those that favor investment in capital intensive pollution abatement or uneconomically high expenditures that provide limited benefits,
are disadvantageous and may encourage inefficient forms of pollution
control. 5 ' Learning from past experience, there is reason to believe that
subsidies can be instrumental in funding the start-up of a program that
will repay social dividends many times over the original investment.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Efforts to balance the world's oil production and material well-being
with environmental protection raise ethical issues of great significance.
These issues are addressed, generally speaking, from two different perspectives. Utilitarians claim that the rightness of an act depends solely
on its consequences. If it produces more public welfare or utility, that
is, good consequences, than any other alternative, then it is ethical;
otherwise, it is not."" An opposing point of view, one that would sometimes support the same outcome but for different reasons, is not based
on the consequences or utility of an act at all, but on a commitment to
principle or to duty. This duty-based or deontological approach to ethical
problems advances the proposition that if an act
5 2 obeys a rule, then the
act is right by virtue of obedience to the rule.
For example, Immanual Kant advanced the proposition that we should
act in such a way that a rational person would be willing to accept the
basis of this action as a universal law.' In this context one would have
to ask whether rational people could willingly embrace the prospect of
everyone using the oceans as a receptacle for oil pollution. If the answer
to this is no, then it is unethical to continue such a course of action.
Further addressing this problem, the American philosopher John Rawls
wrote that each generation should hand to the next a situation on which
it has improved, just as it expected from the previous generation a situation
on which it had improved:
[We should] ask what is reasonable for members of adjacent generations to expect of one another at each level of (historical) advance.
They should try to piece together a just savings schedule by balancing
how much at each stage (of history) they would be willing to save
for their immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled
to claim of their immediate predecessors. Thus imagining themselves
J. HrrE, supra note 106, at 99.
Id. at 104-07.
D. LyoNs, FoRMs AND LiMrrs OF UTILITARIANISM 3 (1965).
V. BARRY, MORAL ISSUS iN BusiNuss 52-54 (1979).
153. I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 70 (Paton trans. 1964).
149.
150.
151.
152.
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to be parents, say, they are to ascertain how much they would set
aside for their children by noting what they would believe themselves
entitled to claim of their own parents.'"
This is not to say, of course, that utilitarians or deontologists would
uniformly support the specific recommendations put forth in this article.
On the other hand, these proposals are consistent with both of these
schools of thought.
Given the utilitarian view, oil pollution is the down side of all the
material gains, that is, public welfare or utility, that are made possible
through the petroleum industry. But does this utility outweigh the disutility
of destroying the oceans of the world, oceans that nurture life supporting
food chains? While ethical inquiries of this sort will not support a particular legal or technological "fix," they at least lend credence to the
balanced proposals of this article, proposals that instill environmental
integrity into the continual flow of oil.
As for the deontologists' view, let us examine a rule that a one-dimensional man, economically-rational man would obey. Garret Hardin
theorizes that the economic man will overexploit a resource without concern for conservation or pollution because it is in his material self-interest
to do so, and if one person conserves others will merely exploit what has
been conserved, since it is part of the "commons."' 55 If this purely
economic or free-market approach is followed, the oceans are likely to
succumb to the effects of oil pollution. That is why market or economic
rationality must be informed by ethical considerations. Whether a person
is influenced by utilitarian concepts, or by deontological ones, there can
be little question that the insights gained through ethical analysis will
advance the type of solutions that are being posed.
CONCLUSION
The marine oil pollution problem can be attributed largely to two
sources: the routine discharge of oil from ships during deballasting and
tank washing after unloading tonnage, and oil spills. If these two sources
of pollution are targeted, oil pollution will be reduced significantly.
In eliminating the problem of routine discharge from tank cleaning, it
has been proposed that after a tanker has unloaded at its destination it be
required to wash its tanks and discharge the wash water containing oil
into environmentally sound inland disposal facilities. Because oil floats
on water, it could then be skimmed off the top of the disposal pits and
taken by truck to refineries. The proceeds from this oil sold to the refineries
154. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JusricE 189 (1971).
155. Kindt, Prolegomenon to Marine Pollution and the Law of the Sea: An Overview of the
Pollution Problem, 11 ENVTL. L. 67 (1980).
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could be used to support the skimming and trucking efforts. Setting up
this type of system would be expensive, and should be subsidized by oil
producing and shipping nations in proportion to their tonnage. After the
system is operational, it could be self-supporting. Set-up costs could be
raised through temporary levies on tankers and oil companies. Tankers
also should be encouraged to utilize the Load-on-Top method and update
their ships to avoid operational oil problems. A charge system is a feasible
and appropriate enforcement mechanism to provide the incentive for such
changes.
There is but one solution to the problem of oil spills, and that is the
abolition of flags of convenience registry. The termination of flags of
convenience would put an end to the causes of most oil spills-poorly
trained crews and shoddy ship construction. Elimination of the less stringent safety standards under flags of convenience would greatly enhance
a tanker's ability to make a voyage without running aground, colliding
with objects or other ships, or losing oil because of structural failure.
These proposals, while subject to economic constraints, are at least an
attempt to curb what in the last two decades has become an increasingly
noticeable problem. Marine oil pollution has arisen as a very real concern
among scientific circles. One writer puts it this way: "As ecologists have
started to warn us, many environmental systems do not deteriorate gradually but, rather, are able to maintain the basic integrity of their character
virtually until the point of collapse." "156 The amount of pollution the oceans
can absorb is deceptive, and if marine oil pollution continues, the oceans
will inevitably be rendered useless.

156. Falk. Toward A World Order Respectful of the Global Ecosystem, 1 ENvrL. AVF. 251. 252
(1971).

